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IN-COURT RACIAL VOICE
IDENTIFICATIONS:
THEY DON'T ALL SOUND THE SAME
I. INTRODUCTION
In Clifford v. Chandler,' the Sixth Circuit recently held that the
admission of a witness's racial voice identification testimony-that a
drug dealer sounded like a Black male-did not violate the Due
Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 In so holding, the
court relied on cases from other jurisdictions admitting similar
testimony, but applied them out of context to the distinguishable
facts of this case. In applying inconsistent rationales, the court
improperly evaluated the admissibility of the voice identification
evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, thus allowing
substantially prejudicial testimony to bolster the prosecution's
testimony, and leading to Clifford's conviction.
By comparing only the testimony itself to that held admissible in
other jurisdictions, the court set the dangerous precedent of
admitting such statements without considering the particular facts of
the case that determine the probativeness and prejudicial effect of the
evidence, and would otherwise call for its exclusion under Rule 403.
II. THE PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF CLIFFORD
A. Facts
1. The "Sting"
On May 20, 1996, Detective William Birkenhauer of the
Northern Kentucky Drug Strike Force set up a drug "sting" operation
1. 333 F.3d 724 (6th Cir. 2003).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (no State shall "deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law").
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with the assistance of police informant Gary Vanover.3 Vanover
arranged a meeting at his apartment, at which time Birkenhauer was
to purchase a quarter ounce of crack cocaine from Vanover's friend,
Charles Clifford.4
2. The Competing Testimonies
a. Detective William Birkenhauer
At trial, Birkenhauer testified that when he arrived at the
apartment for the meeting, Vanover was accompanied by a female
friend, and Clifford was in the bedroom.5 Clifford emerged from the
bedroom and told Birkenhauer that he only had seventy five dollars
worth of crack cocaine, but could supply the rest later that
afternoon.6 Birkenhauer stated he would "take the '75' and return
later for the rest.",7 Clifford then went back to the bedroom with
Vanover, and Vanover returned alone with the crack cocaine and
gave it to Birkenhauer.
8
b. Informant Gary Vanover
Gary Vanover contradicted Birkenhauer and testified that he, not
Clifford, made the sale to Birkenhauer.9 Vanover stated that the
cocaine belonged to him, it was he who promised to supply the rest,
and that there was no drug transaction between Clifford and
Birkenhauer. 10
c. Officer Darin Smith
Unknown to either Clifford or Vanover, Birkenhauer was
wearing a hidden "wire" transmitter that enabled another police
officer, Darin Smith, to listen from a nearby apartment."1 The tape
recording of the drug transaction was barely audible and was not
3. Clifford v. Commonwealth, 7 S.W.3d 371, 373 (Ky. 2000).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See id.
10. Id.
11. Clifford, 7 S.W.3d at 373.
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admitted into evidence, but Smith testified as to what he heard over
the transmitter. 12
Smith testified to hearing four different voices: Birkenhauer's,
another male's, a female's, and a fourth voice that "sounded as if it
was of a male black.' 3 Smith stated it was the Black male's voice
he heard engaged in the drug transaction. 14 Clifford is a Black male,
while Vanover is white. 15 Smith's cross-examination went as
follows:
Q: Okay. Well, how does a [B]lack man sound?
A: Uh, some male [B]lacks have a, a different sound of, of
their voice. Just as if I have a different sound of my voice
as Detective Birkenhauer does. I sound different than you.
Q: Okay, can you demonstrate that for the jury?
A: I don't think that would be a fair and accurate
description of the, you know, of the way the man sounds.
Q: So not all male [B]lacks sound alike?
A: That's correct, yes.
Q: Okay. In fact, some of them sound like whites, don't
they?
A: Yes.
Q: Do all whites sound alike?
A: No sir.
Q: Okay. Do some white people sound like [B]lacks when
they're talking?
A: Possibly, yes.
16
A jury convicted Clifford of one count of trafficking in a controlled
substance in the Campbell Circuit Court of Kentucky. 17 On appeal,
Clifford challenged the admissibility of Smith's "opinion" that the
fourth voice he heard sounded like a Black male.1" The Supreme
Court of Kentucky affirmed the conviction, holding that Smith's
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 373-74.
15. Id. at 373.
16. Id. at 374.
17. Id. at 373.
18. Id. at 374-76.
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opinion was permissible as lay testimony. 19 The court relied on
People v. Sanchez2 ° in holding that the "collective facts rule"21
permitted a person to express an opinion that a voice they heard was
of a particular race.2 2  The district court denied rehearing, and
Clifford appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. 13 The Sixth
Circuit then affirmed the denial.24
B. The Sixth Circuit Analysis
Clifford claimed on appeal that Smith's racial voice
identification violated his Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights
because the identification was inherently unreliable and prejudicial.25
To support his first claim that the voice identification was inherently
unreliable, Clifford cited Neil v. Biggers26 and Manson v.
Brathwaite,27 prohibiting unreliable identification procedures as
unconstitutional. 28 The court disagreed, on the grounds that Neil and
Manson were not broad enough to apply to the present case.29 Neil
and Manson proscribed pretrial identification procedures used by law
enforcement that were so "impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to
the likelihood of misidentification." 30 In applying the rules to this
case, the court held that no suggestive procedures were used to
identify Clifford, noting that Smith never even identified Clifford at
all.
31
19. Id. at 374 (citing KY. R. EvID. 701 ("If the witness is not testifying as
an expert, the witness' testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is
limited to those opinions or inferences which are: (a) Rationally based on the
perception of the witness; and (b) Helpful to a clear understanding of the
witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.")).
20. 492 N.Y.S.2d 683 (Sup. Ct. 1985).
21. The "collective facts rule" allows the court to permit a lay witness to
resort to a conclusion or opinion to describe an observation, where there is no
alternative way to communicate that observation to the jury. Clifford, 7
S.W.3d at 374.
22. Id. at 375.
23. Clifford v. Chandler, 333 F.3d 724, 726 (6th Cir. 2003).
24. Id. at 732.
25. Id. at 730.
26. 409 U.S. 188, 198 (1972).
27. 432 U.S. 98, 112(1977).
28. Clifford, 333 F.3d at 730-31.
29. Id. at731.
30. Id. (quoting Ledbetter v. Edwards, 35 F.3d 1062, 1070 (6th Cir. 1994)).
31. Id.
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The court stated that even without the limitations of the two
Supreme Court cases, it would likely have found the voice
identification reliable anyway.32 The court cited a study in which
421 students at Stanford University were asked to identify the racial
identity of twenty different speakers, and students correctly
identified the African-American males 88% of the time.33 It further
supported its holding that racial voice identification was reliable by
citing cases from other jurisdictions that held similar testimony
admissible.34
The court then rejected Clifford's claim that Smith's
identification was unconstitutionally prejudicial. Despite
recognizing that the Constitution prohibits racially based arguments,
the court "rejecte[d] the notion [that] the mere identification of an
individual's race by his voice will always result in unconstitutional
prejudice."
35
To illustrate, the court cited State v. Kinard,36 where a rape
victim could not see her attacker's face but could hear his voice.
That court allowed the victim to testify that the voice of her attacker
sounded Black.37 The Clifford court argued that "such probative
evidence should not be excluded simply because of an ambiguous
concern over the possibility of racial prejudice."
38
Before concluding, the court noted that a defendant was not
precluded from showing that racial voice identification was
improper.39  However, the defendant would have to demonstrate
32. Id.
33. Id. (citing Thomas Purnell et al., Perceptual and Phonetic Experiments
on American English Dialect Identification, 18 J. LANGUAGE & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 10, 19-20 (1999) [hereinafter Purnell]).
34. Id. at 731-32 (citing United States v. Card, 86 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1116
(D. Utah 2000) ("perpetrator of robberies 'talked like' or 'acted like' an
African-American"); State v. Smith, 415 S.E.2d 409, 415 (S.C. Ct. App. 1993)
(describing a caller as a white male); State v. Kinard, 696 P.2d 603, 604
(Wash. Ct. App. 1985) (the robber "'sounded [B]lack to me"'); State v.
McDaniel, 392 S.W.2d 310, 315 (Mo. 1965) (testimony that the voices heard
during the robbery had a Black accent); Rhea v. State, 147 S.W. 463, 468 (Ark.
1912) (the witness testified that the voice he heard in a crowd of African-
Americans was a white man's)).
35. Id. at 731.
36. 696 P.2d 603 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985).
37. Id. at 605.
38. Clifford, 333 F.3d at 732.
39. Id.
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"how the identification was inappropriately prejudicial in his
particular case." 40 Finally, concluding that the voice identification
was not used in a prejudicial manner in this particular case, the court
affirmed the district court's decision denying Clifford's motion for a
writ of habeas corpus.'
III. THE COURT SHOULD HAVE EXCLUDED BIRKENHAUER'S
TESTIMONY BECAUSE OF THE DANGER OF UNDUE PREJUDICE
The Federal Rules of Evidence allow for the exclusion of
relevant evidence if "its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice. '" 2 Rule 403 requires the court to
balance the relative probative value of the evidence against the
prejudicial risk of misuse.43
A. Probative Value
1. Smith's Voice Identification Had Little Probative Value Because
of Birkenhauer's Eyewitness Testimony
While dismissing Clifford's claim of undue prejudice, the court
expressed concerns about excluding the "best evidence" available
because of a remote danger of prejudice:44
[U]nder the theory propounded by [Clifford] the trial court
would be required to exclude a rape victim's testimony
about the race of her attacker when she did not see his face
but only heard his voice. Such probative evidence should
not be excluded simply because of an ambiguous concern
over the possibility of racial prejudice.45
The inherent flaw in the Sixth Circuit's analysis is apparent through
its use of a factually distinguishable case to illustrate its reasoning in
Clifford. The critical difference in Clifford is that Birkenhauer's
eyewitness testimony substantially diminishes the probative value of
Smith's voice identification.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. FED. R. EvID. 403.
43. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 172-73 (1997).
44. Clifford, 333 F.3d at 731.
45. Id. at 732 (citing State v. Kinard, 696 P.2d 603, 605 (Wash. Ct. App.
1985)) (citation omitted).
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In its reasoning, the court cites State v. Kinard,46 where a
robbery victim was permitted to testify that her attacker "sounded
[B]lack.' 4 7 In Kinard, one of the robbers held a pillow over the
victim's head and she only heard their voices.48 Since there were no
other witnesses, the victim's voice testimony was crucial to
identifying the attacker, and this court asserted that it would not
exclude such probative evidence due to ambiguous concerns of racial
prejudice.49
The Clifford court cites several other cases holding equivalent
testimony admissible. 50 In one case, State v. McDaniel,51 testimony
that the voice of the robber (who was wearing a mask) had a Negro
accent was admitted because of its significance in "identify[ing] the
probable race of the robbers. 52 In every case the court cites, the
racial identification came from a single "earwitness ' 53 and was
admissible because it was vital to the identification of the defendant.
The defendant's accent was the best available evidence linking the
defendant to the crime because there were no eyewitnesses.
In contrast, Smith's testimony in Clifford had very little
probative value because there was an eyewitness directly linking
Clifford to the crime. The "best evidence" available was
Birkenhauer's testimony that he negotiated the drug transaction
directly with Clifford. The court compared the testimony to that in
McDaniel, stating that Smith merely purported to identify the race of
the voice he heard engaged in the crime.54 But unlike McDaniel, it
46. 696 P.2d 603.
47. Id. at 604.
48. Id.
49. Clifford, 333 F.3d at 732.
50. See supra note 33.
51. 392 S.W.2d 310 (Mo. 1965).
52. Id. at 315.
53. Clifford, 333 F.3d at 731 (citing United States v. Card, 86 F. Supp. 2d
1115 (D. Utah 2000) (where the robbers wore masks or disguises); State v.
Smith, 415 S.E.2d 409 (S.C. Ct. App. 1993) (the witness spoke to the killer
over the telephone); State v. Kinard, 696 P.2d 603 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985) (the
robber jammed a pillow over the victim's head); State v. McDaniel, 392
S.W.2d 310 (Mo. 1965) (where the robbers wore masks); Rhea v. State, 147
S.W. 463 (Ark. 1912) (the witness was too far from a crowd of people to
identify any of their races, but was able to hear their voices)).
54. Id. at 732.
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was of no consequence to identify the drug dealer's probable race,
since Birkenhauer had already identified Clifford.
By comparing Smith's testimony to similar racial identifications
admitted in other cases, the court accorded it too much probative
weight. Rather than being the best available evidence as in the cited
cases, or the only evidence linking the defendant to the crime,
Smith's testimony was merely cumulative because of Birkenhauer's
eyewitness testimony.
2. Smith's Testimony Had Little Value Without Evidence of
Clifford's Actual Voice
The material fact at issue in this case was whether it was
Clifford or Vanover who sold the drugs. Although Birkenhauer
identified Clifford as the drug dealer, Vanover gave conflicting
testimony that it was actually he, and not Clifford, who sold the
drugs. 55 Therefore, the only way that Smith's testimony could have
had significant probative value is if it tended to show it was Clifford,
instead of Vanover, who negotiated the drug deal.
Presumably, that effect could have been achieved if Smith had
specifically identified the voice he heard as Clifford's voice, or at the
very least, with a showing that Clifford's manner of speech indeed
sounded like that of a male Black. Absent such evidence, Smith's
testimony alone had no value. The dissent in Clifford v.
Commonwealth56 aptly pointed out that Smith's testimony "in no
way tended to increase the probability that [Clifford] was the
speaker, because there was no showing that [Clifford], himself,
spoke in the manner described. 57
The court attempted to support the reliability of the racial voice
identification by noting a study in which participants were asked to
identify the races of twenty different speakers.58 The study's
participants correctly identified African-American males by the
sounds of their voices approximately 88% of the time.59 While the
study supports a finding that someone's voice is a reliable indicator
55. Clifford v. Commonwealth, 7 S.W.3d 371, 373 (Ky. 2000).
56. Id. at 371.
57. Id. at 379.
58. Clifford, 333 F.3d at 731 (citing Purnell, supra note 33).
59. Id.
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of their race,60 it does not provide any findings as to the probability
that Clifford actually speaks with an African-American accent. In
fact, the same study states that the speech patterns of African
Americans are learned characteristics and cannot be predicted by
race.6 1 Without evidence of what Clifford's voice or speech sounds
like, Smith's testimony had little probative value in proving that
Clifford, and not Vanover, was the man who negotiated the drug
deal.
B. Danger of Undue Prejudice
1. Smith's Testimony Produced a Danger of Racial Prejudice
Absent a showing that Clifford actually speaks with an African-
American accent, the jury was forced to make the "impermissible
inference" that it was Clifford's voice that Smith heard, simply
because he is Black.62 Smith's testimony was unfairly prejudicial,
within the meaning provided by the rule's advisory committee,
because it created an "undue tendency to suggest decision on an
improper basis.
' 63
Smith's testimony that the drug dealer sounded Black, and the
fact that Clifford was the "lone [B]lack man sitting at the defense
table," 64 was highly prejudicial. The jury was left to presume that
Clifford spoke with what some linguists call "Black English,"65 and
60. Compare with Justice Johnstone's dissent, arguing that it is contrary to
common sense that a person can ascertain a person's race solely by hearing his
voice. That would be "tantamount to saying [that] one can 'hear a color' or
'smell a sound' or 'taste a noise.' One can no more determine that a person's
skin is pale, cinnamon, or ebony simply by hearing his voice, than one can
perceive that an individual will have a British accent... simply by gazing at
his countenance and the color of his skin." Clifford, 7 S.W.3d at 378.
61. Purnell, supra note 33, at 14 (this fact is demonstrated by the African-
American author's ability to mimic the speech patterns of Blacks, Chicanos,
and Standard American English speakers, having grown up in inner-city
communities).
62. Clifford, 7 S.W.3d at 378.
63. FED. R. EvID. 403 advisory committee's note.
64. Clifford, 7 S.W.3d 371 at 378.
65. See Jill Gaulding, Against Common Sense: Why Title VII Should
Protect Speakers of Black English, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 637, 638-39
(1998) (discussing the different labels used to identify the particular speech
pattern of many Blacks in the United States).
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to conclude that he was the man Smith heard selling drugs. That
conclusion, then, is clearly suggested on an improper basis.
In addition, even though the jury could already see that Clifford
was African-American, the implicit characterization that he also
sounded Black could have intensified any existing stereotypical
images of Black males66 or unconscious prejudices of the jurors.
Black English is often associated with negative connotations67 that
do not necessarily attach to African-Americans who speak Standard
American English. "[I]f someone is black, but they speak with the
same accent as a Midwestern white person, it completely changes the
perception of them., 68 Ironically, the study that the Clifford court
cited was conducted to show discrimination against Blacks based
solely on their voices. 69 Thus, the assumption that Clifford sounded
Black created a likelihood of producing damaging racial imagery in
the jurors' minds.
70
2. Smith's Testimony Tended to Implicate Clifford Solely
Because of His Race
The court also cited United States v. Card,71 which admitted
similar racial identification evidence over a Rule 403 objection
because its probative value substantially outweighed the danger of
prejudice.72 The court held the evidence was not prejudicial because
66. See Lis Wiehl, "Sounding Black" in the Courtroom: Court-Sanctioned
Racial Stereotyping, 18 HARV. BLACKLETrER L.J. 185, 186 n.12, 201 n.116
(2002) (noting the public's preconceptions in associating Black males with
drug crimes, especially involving crack cocaine).
67. Gaulding, supra note 65, at 641, 646 n.49 (some connotations include
uneducated, disreputable, lazy, and inferior).
68. Id. at 644 (quoting Joleen Kirschenman & Kathryn M. Neckerman,
"We'd Love to Hire Them, But... ": The Meaning of Race for Employers, in
THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 203, 224 (Christopher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson
eds., 1991)).
69. Purnell, supra note 33, at 10 ("This article, detailing four experiments,
shows that housing discrimination based solely on telephone conversations
occurs.").
70. See Sheir Lynn Johnson, Racial Imagery in Criminal Cases, 67 TUL. L.
REV. 1739 (1993) (discussing the dangers of both blatant and subtle racial
imagery in criminal cases).
71. 86 F. Supp. 2d 1115 (D. Utah 2000) (admitting testimony that one of
the perpetrators spoke like an African-American, where the bank robbers wore
disguises so that witnesses could not see their skin or hair).
72. Id. at 1118-19.
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it was not "used to suggest that because of [defendant's] ethnic
status, he was more likely to commit the offense... . [R]ather, [it
was] directly related to the legitimate factor of identification in the
case."
73
Though similar, Smith's testimony was not truly used for mere
identification purposes. An eyewitness identified both Clifford and
Vanover as being present at the scene of the drug deal. Due to
conflicting accounts of who actually sold the drugs, Smith's
testimony was used to bolster Birkenhauer's contention that it was
Clifford. The prosecution was suggesting that it was more likely that
Clifford sold the drugs than Vanover because the voice that
negotiated the drug deal sounded Black. It is doubtful that the
prosecution intended to suggest Clifford was more likely to have
committed the crime because of his ethnic status, but Smith's
testimony essentially had the same effect. Both led the jury to
deduce that because Clifford is Black, he was more likely the person
who sold drugs to the undercover police officer. Therefore, while
the jury was free to believe either Birkenhauer's or Vanover's
conflicting testimony, Smith's testimony was used to bolster
Birkenhauer's testimony based on Clifford's race.
This Comment does not argue that the prosecution intended to
appeal to the racial prejudice of the jurors, or that the danger of
prejudice was necessarily strong, but that any risk of undue prejudice
should have excluded the evidence because its probative value was
so insignificant. "Where the evidence is of very slight (if any)
probative value, it's an abuse of discretion to admit it if there's even
a modest likelihood of unfair prejudice ... ."74 Unlike the cases cited
by the court, the racial voice testimony did not have any value as
identification evidence because Clifford had already been identified
by an eyewitness.
The disputed facts for the jury to consider were the conflicting
testimonies of Birkenhauer and Vanover. As identification was not
the real issue, Smith's testimony was used to reinforce Birkenhauer's
version of events. However, because the sound of Clifford's voice
was unknown, Smith's testimony had very little probative value.
The court should not have admitted the testimony because it
73. Id. at 1119.
74. United States v. Hitt, 981 F.2d 422, 424 (9th Cir. 1992) (emphasis
added).
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produced the danger that the jury would impermissibly rely on racial
stereotypes to link Clifford to the voice that Smith heard over the
transmitter.
IV. IMPLICATION
The court's holding moves the judicial consideration of racial
voice testimony in the direction of an inflexible rule of admissibility,
rather than toward the case-by-case balancing inquiry that Rule 403
requires. The court erred by relying on cases that permitted similar
testimony, but used in a different context. By comparing Smith's
testimony to similar racial identifications held admissible in other
cases, the court overvalued its probativeness, and almost
mechanically held it admissible. If other jurisdictions follow form
and presume admissibility of racial voice testimony simply because
it is identical to the testimony admitted in Clifford, the admission of
impermissibly prejudicial evidence will continue, contrary to the
purposes of Rule 403.
The Supreme Court has recognized the possibility that racism
may influence jury decisions, and has held that racially biased
arguments are unconstitutional.75 What's more, even in cases that
involve "special circumstances" that merely create a risk of racial
prejudice, the defendant is entitled to question prospective jurors
with respect to racial prejudice.76 Notwithstanding these protections
against biased arguments and "special circumstances," racial
prejudice is less obvious when in the form of unconscious racism,
subtle references which invoke a "set of beliefs whereby we
irrationally attach significance to ... race.",
77
75. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 311 (1987).
76. Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 35-38 (1986) (recognizing the
likelihood that the unconscious racial attitudes of the jurors might have
influenced the capital sentence of a Black defendant for the murder of a white
victim, the court held that the trial judge failed to adequately protect the
defendant's constitutional right to an impartial jury).
77. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 330 (1987). In
this article, the author discusses the ineffectiveness of the current equal
protection doctrine in eradicating racial discrimination. Since the doctrine
requires a showing of discriminatory purpose before invalidating legislation as
unconstitutional, it ignores the fact that racial discrimination is often a product
of unconscious racial motivation. The same argument can be made in
eradicating racism in the courtroom. Even though the courts prohibit racially
1328
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The Clifford court established that in order to show racial voice
testimony is improper, the defendant has the burden of showing how
the identification was inappropriately prejudicial in his particular
case.78 This is an unreasonable burden if racial prejudice is mostly a
product of the subconscious, since each juror's response to particular
racial imagery is impossible to determine.79
The court noted that there was no evidence that the voice
identification was used to inflame the jury, or that the lower court
judge made inappropriate references to the identification.
80
However, "[b]y insisting that a blameworthy perpetrator be found
before the existence of racial discrimination can be acknowledged,
the Court creates an imaginary world where discrimination does not
exist unless it was consciously intended.",8' Thus, the court's
requirement of a showing of improper intent presents a hurdle that is
almost impossible to overcome, and in effect not only creates an
inflexible rule of admissibility, but hinders the goal of eradicating
racism in the courtroom.
V. CONCLUSION
Courts should recognize the possibility of unconscious racism
among jurors and be wary of race-based testimony. Due to the
unreasonableness of identifying racial prejudice, whenever racial
testimony is used, courts should presume a possibility of prejudice
and only admit evidence that has strong probative value. Rule 403 is
not a difficult hurdle, and in the cases cited by the court, the value of
the racial identifications easily outweighed the danger of undue
prejudice. This court erred by presuming probative value and
dismissing Rule 403 considerations with hardly a second glance. By
failing to take into consideration a major distinguishing factor from
biased arguments, even subtle references to race may trigger unconscious
racism.
78. Clifford v. Chandler, 333 F.3d 724, 732 (6th Cir. 2003).
79. Johnson, supra note 70, at 1743.
80. Clifford, 333 F.3d at 732.
81. Lawrence, supra note 77, at 324-25.
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other racial voice identification cases, the court admitted unduly
prejudicial testimony that resulted in a conviction.
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